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Chaos: When the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not
approximately determine the future.
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Abstract
Some chaotic systems are advantageously capable of self-synchronizing with a like
system through a single shared state. Using a plain text binary message, a single
system parameter can be modulated to mask this message and transmit it securely
through the single shared state. The most simple implementations of this encryption
technique are, however, vulnerable to the return map attack. Using a time-scaling
factor to further obfuscate the modulation process, a return map attack immunity is
gained. We report on the progress towards a realization of this process in real-time
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On a cold winters day in January 1917 the value of strong encryption and the damage
weak security can cause were made known. British intelligence in Room 40 intercepted
a diplomatic cable from Germany to Mexico. This coded message was broken, and
the realization of German intentions to make Mexico its ally against the United States
(Pincock, 2006, CH. 4). This news, once public, along with Germany’s continuation
of unrestricted submarine warfare on passenger and merchant ships lead the United
States into the Great War. The Germans would fall prey to a broken cipher again
in the Second World War with the failure of the far more complex Enigma (Sebag-
Montefiore, 2011).
Cryptography and the use of ciphers can be traced to much earlier in human history.
Cryptanalysis methods and code breaking can be traced back to the work of Al-
Kindi, who developed a frequency-analysis method for breaking substitution ciphers
(Pincock, 2006, CH. 1). Privacy and secrecy has only become more necessary and
complex as history has continued to present day. The importance is easy to see from
examples of military history, but even encryption for private citizens is now necessary
with the common place use of online banking and shopping.
The digital computer has allowed the usage of cheap, fast and automatic encryption
to become possible. However the computer, even in rudimentary forms such as the
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Bombe machines that broke the Enigma (Keen, 2003), has improved code cracking
capabilities. At a minimum the computer has exponentially increased the speed at
which brute force methods can function. To combat this capability, methods such as
asymmetric ciphers (Rivest et al., 1978) and symmetric ciphers (Daemen and Rijmen,
2013) have been designed to take advantage of computational capabilities of modern
machines. These methods however require computational overhead and offer with
each use only one layer of encryption.
Chaotic encryption seeks to provide a second method of security through masking of
data with a chaotic system that is highly sensitive to system parameters and initial
conditions (Lu et al., 2002). This usage of a non-linear system allows for a layered
encryption over a bit-wise encrypted signal. Methods exist to use maps (Makris and
Antoniou, 2012) as well as using chaotic non-linear system models (Liu and Tsimring,
2006). This work studies the use of the latter, the use of a non-linear system model
to mask a binary plain text message known as Chaotic Shift Keying (CSK). We seek
to use a minimal amount of processing power to accomplish such a goal. We plan
to provide a method of encryption to low processing power applications, as well as
provide a second layer of encryption to already encrypted digital data.
1.1 Organization
This thesis is organized into chapters to cover the practicality of a Lorenz based
chaotic stream cipher. Chapter 2 will provide necessary background on the use of
a chaotic stream cipher, the vulnerabilities of such a system, and the time-scaling
factor added to increase security. Chapter 2 will also give a brief basic background
of the circuitry fundamentals. Chapter 3 covers the practical implementation of the
CSK system, in simulation and in circuitry. Chapter 3 will also cover the methods
and metrics of the system performance analysis. Chapter 4 contains the results of
the simulated and practical systems. Chapter 5 is the discussion of the results and




2.1 The Lorenz Chaotic System
In 1963, Edward Lorenz created model for simulating convectional flow in the
atmosphere (Lorenz, 1963). This model showed, for certain parameter ranges,
interesting tendencies of which small changes in initial conditions lead to significantly
different outcomes later within the system. This system as described by Lorenz (1963)
is shown below:
ẋ = σ(y − x)
ẏ = (β − z)x− y
ż = xy − ρz
(2.1)
The parameters β,ρ, and σ are real positive values, and only certain value ranges
and relations result in a chaotic system. In relation to Lorenz’s original use for this
system, β and σ are the Rayleigh number and Prandtl number. ρ is based on the
physical proportion (Sparrow, 2012).
3














Figure 2.1: A plot of x vs y from the Lorenz system, this is commonly referred to
as the butterfly attractor
2.1.1 System Characteristics
To show that certain parameter choices lead to asymptotic stability, rather than the
chaotic behavior as seen in Figure 2.1, one can use a Lyapunov function.










V̇ (x, y, z, t) =
1
σ
ẋ+ yẏ + zż
= −x2 + xy + βxy − xyz − y2 + xyz − ρz2











x2 − ρz2 (2.3)
4
The Lyapunov equation (2.2) is positive definite and V (x, y, z, t) = 0 iff x, y, z = 0.
The time derivative, V̇ (x, y, z, t), is also negative definite for all selections of β ≤ 1.
(1 + β)2
4
− 1 < 0
β2 + 2β − 3 < 0
(β − 1)(β + 3) < 0 (2.4)
This can be viewed in the terms of equilibrium of the system as well. The Lorenz
system has equilibrium:
0 = y − x
0 = (β − z)x− y
0 = xy − ρz
This will lead to the relationships of:
x = y


























Clearly when β ≤ 1 the only existing real equilibrium is (0,0,0). The nature of the
























σ + 1 +
√







The last two possible eigenvalues, λJ2 and λJ3 will always have a real part < 0.
However the first eigenvalue, λJ1 will have real part > 0 when:
σ + 1 <
√
σ2 + (4β − 2)σ + 1
σ2 + 2σ + 1 < σ2 + (4β − 2)σ + 1
2 < 4β − 2
β > 1
This result indicates that as β becomes greater than 1, the origin becomes unstable
and two more equilibrium appear. Another interesting relationship of the Lorenz
system can be extracted from the eigenvalues (λJ) of the Jacobian about the origin.
Sparrow cites a unique relationship about these eigenvalues that is:
−λJ3 < λJ1 < −λJ2 (2.8)
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Under the condition that:
β > 1 +
ρ(σ + 1 + ρ)
σ
(2.9)
To gather further behavioral characteristics of the Lorenz system, the Jacobian











ρ(β − 1) −ρ

 (2.10)
The characteristic equation of the Jacobian, |λI − Jα1| = 0, is then found as:
λ3 + (σ + ρ+ 1)λ2 + ρ(σ + β)λ+ 2σρ(β − 1) = 0 (2.11)
Calculating the roots generically is cumbersome and not necessary for evaluation of
the Lorenz system in respect to chaotic encryption. There is an alternate method
at which to approach the roots of the equilibrium α1 and α2 such as to guarantee
chaotic behavior. The roots that are desired are those that create a Hopf bifurcation
(Sparrow, 2012). These can be found by selecting a σ and ρ such that the discriminate
of (2.11) is negative ∀ β > 1.
∆ = 18w0w1w2 − 4w32w0 + w22w21 − 4w31 − 27w20 (2.12)
Where:
w0 = 2σρ(β − 1)
w1 = ρ(σ + β)
w2 = σ + ρ+ 1
7
In the case that ∆ < 0 the eigenvalues consist of one real value and two complex values
(Irving, 2003). This is a useful property for making relations of (2.11) to chaotic
behavior. Specifically it is desired that α1 and α2 be linearly unstable (Sparrow,
2012). This transition will occur at λ = ±qi, where i =
√
−1 and q is real and
positive. Setting λ = qi in (2.11) yields:
−q3i− (σ + ρ+ 1)q2 + ρ(σ + β)qi+ 2σρ(β − 1) = 0 + 0i
(−(σ + ρ+ 1)q2 + 2σρ(β − 1)) + q(−q2 + ρ(σ + β))i = 0 + 0i
As such
−q2 + ρ(σ + β) = 0
ρ(σ + β) = q2
−(σ + ρ+ 1)q2 + 2σρ(β − 1) = 0
2σρ(β − 1) = −(σ + ρ+ 1)q2
2σρ(β − 1)
σ + ρ+ 1
= q2
Merging the two equations together to find the Hopf bifurcation point βh
ρ(σ + βh) =
2σρ(βh − 1)
σ + ρ+ 1
ρ(σ − ρ− 1)βh = ρσ(σ + ρ+ 3)
βh =
σ(σ + ρ+ 3)
σ − ρ− 1 (2.13)
As can be seen by (2.13) for βh > 0 the conditions of σ and ρ can be constrained such
that:
σ > ρ+ 1 (2.14)




The Lorenz equation is bounded for all positive real parameter selections. It is obvious
from the results of (2.7) that for β ≤ 1 the system is stable and therefore bounded.




2 + z2) + 2a3z (2.15)
V̇ = 2a1xẋ+ 2a2(yẏ + zż) + 2a3ż
= −2a1σx2 − 2a2y2 − 2a2ρz2 + (2a1σ + 2a2ρ+ 2a3)xy − 2a3ρz (2.16)
Rather than using the Lyapunov function relations described by Slotine et al. and
used in other Lyapunov function examples in this thesis, Swinnerton-Dyer suggests
the relation:
V̇ + λ(V − c) ≤ 0 (2.17)
This more general application of Lyapunov stability theory allows one to state that
V > c =⇒ V̇ < 0. As such, if a function V can be found such that (2.17) is true,
then the system described by V is bounded by at least V = c. As such:
a1(λ− 2σ)x2 + a2(λ− 2)y2 + a2(λ− 2ρ)z2 + 2(a1σ + a2β + a3)xy + 2a3(λ− ρ)z − λc < 0
(2.18)
From (2.18) Swinnerton-Dyer details required constraints such that (2.17) is true.
a1(λ− 2σ) ≤ 0
a2(λ− 2) ≤ 0
(σa1 + βa2 + a3)
2 ≤ a1a2(2σ − λ)(2− λ)
a2(λ− 2ρ) ≤ 0
c ≥ 0
λca2(2ρ− λ) ≥ a23(ρ− λ)2
(2.19)
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A set ΩV is then described as the set such that V ≤ c and is the bounded region of




a3 = −σa1 − βa2
a1 > 0
a2 > 0
0 < λ < min(2, 2ρ)














Two like chaotic systems with different starting initial conditions can be matched to
the same trajectory by coupling the two systems with a single state shared from one
to the other. This process is known as chaotic synchronization (Pecora and Carroll,
1990). The system providing the shared state is known as the drive system, conversely
the second system is the driven system. Pecora and Carroll show experimentally
that the Lorenz system also has a strict tolerance of system parameter matching for
synchronization to occur.
This property of synchronization in chaotic systems can be exploited to generate an
encryption mask. Oppenheim et al. demonstrate the use of a Lorenz chaotic system
for analog speech signal encryption. An analog speech signal however limits the type
of information that be transmitted securely. Cuomo and Oppenheim and Dedieu
et al. demonstrate the masking of a binary signal with chaos with a Lorenz system
and Chua’s circuit respectively. This method of masking a binary system, known as
10
chaotic shift keying (CSK), has wider use in communication systems of the modern
world. CSK accommodates the capabilities of a digital signal, such as checksum error
detection and bit wise encryption methods.
ẋ1 = σ(x2 − x1)
ẋ2 = (β(m)− x3)x1 − x2
ẋ3 = x1x2 − ρx3
ż1 = σ(z2 − z1)
ż2 = (β0 − z3)x1 − z2
ż3 = x1z2 − ρz3
(2.21)
Equation set (2.21) describes a Lorenz based CSK system. The forcing system,
or transmitter, being represented by x1, x2, x3 and the forced system, or receiver,
represented by z1, z2, z3. The parameter β is used as a binary variable gain to mask





β0 if m = 0
β1 if m = 1
(2.22)
β1 and β0 are selected such that the condition of (2.4) is met, sufficiently different to
prevent noise and parameter uncertainty extraction errors, and within a neighborhood
as not to dramatically change the characteristics of the transmitted state signal. The









Φ1 = x1 − z1
Φ2 = x2 − z2
Φ3 = x3 − z3
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As such the time derivative of the synchronization error states while m = 0 are:
Φ̇1 = ẋ1 − ż1
= σ(Φ2 − Φ1)
Φ̇2 = ẋ2 − ż2
= β0x1 − x3x1 − x2 − β0x1 + z3x1 + z2
= −(x2 − z2)− (x3 − z3)x1
= −Φ3x1 − Φ2
Φ̇3 = ẋ3 − ż3
= x1x2 − ρx3 − x1z2 + ρz3
= (x2 − z2)x1 − ρ(x3 − z3)
= Φ2x1 − ρΦ3
(2.24)
A Lyapunov function, V (Φ), similar to that shown by Cuomo and Oppenheim, can
be selected to show asymptotic stability of the synchronization error Φsync when the














Φ1Φ̇1 + Φ2Φ̇2 + Φ3Φ̇3
= 2(Φ2 − Φ1)Φ1 + (−Φ3x1 − Φ2)Φ2 + (Φ2x1 − ρΦ3)Φ3
= 2Φ1Φ2 − 2Φ21 − Φ22 − ρΦ23
= −(Φ1 − Φ2)2 − Φ21 − ρΦ23 (2.26)
Global asymptotic stability is shown when m = 0. Equation (2.25) is positive definite
and radially unbounded and equation (2.26) is negative definite. Further more it can
12










Figure 2.2: A plot of x1− z1 vs the message m for a double alternating bit space in
real circuitry
be shown that when m = 1 the time derivative of the synchronization error becomes:
Φ̇1 = σ(Φ2 − Φ1)
Φ̇2 = ẋ2 − ż2
= β1x1 − x3x1 − x2 − β0x1 + z3x1 + z2
= (β∆ − Φ3)x1 − Φ2
Φ̇3 = Φ2x1 − ρΦ3
Where
β∆ = β1 − β0





, is no longer an equilibrium for the system. The
effect of this synchronization error mismatch relative to the message m is shown in
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Figure 2.2. It is also important to note that from (2.20) and the leading derivation
from Swinnerton-Dyer that the two mismatched systems are both bounded, as such
Φsync will also be bounded.
2.3 Cryptanalysis and Security
Dynamic chaotic encryption techniques offer a simple mathematical method of
encryption that can be implemented in real-time with analog circuitry and minimal
processing power. Cuomo and Oppenheim (1993) have implemented the CSK system
in circuitry, yet commercial CSK encryption equipment is not widely available. The
CSK system itself unfortunately is not secure. This section will explore the techniques
available to crack and defeat the security of the CSK system.
2.3.1 The Return Map Attack
The return map (RM) attack is a method of monitoring the transmitted state’s local
minimum and maximum points to distinguish changing system characteristics. Pérez
and Cerdeira pioneered this encryption breaking technique. The method is based off
of the observations of Lorenz that a single state can be used to produce a return map
with dynamics that tend towards a one dimensional set.
Pérez and Cerdeira describes the construction of the RM from the nth local maximum
and local minimum of the first or second state of (2.1), denoted as Xn and Y n
respectively. The RM is composed of a comparison of functions:
An = Xn + Y n
Bn = Xn − Y n
(2.27)
Pérez and Cerdeira also describes an additional set of functions that result in an
identical RM due to the symmetric nature of the Lorenz system. Plotting Bn vs An
yields the RM, of which three lines form. One manner to describe this map is to
14






















Figure 2.3: The Return Map calculated from the x output state using the CSK
encryption technique.
correlate how the succeeding local minimum and maximum relate to the foci.
Referencing Figure 2.1 with the state x from (2.1) being on the horizontal axis and y








b 0 > x> −
√
ρ(β − 1)







b′ 0 < x<
√
ρ(β − 1)
From this Bn can be deduced to have three distinct possibilities in region, which
Figure 2.3 clearly shows. A region that correlates to a transition from one focus to















































Figure 2.4: The Return Time Map calculated from the x output state using a simple
switch TS-CSK encryption technique.
and Bn will be at it’s largest value. The other instances are then those minimum and
maximums that occur and the trajectory travels about the two foci.
The CSK method described in (2.21), which relies on direct parameter modulation
to encrypted the data either through the parameter β or ρ will always be vulnerable
to the RM attack. The CSK method obviously changes the foci based on which
bit is present and as such distorts the dynamics of the system enough that a RM
vulnerability is made evident (Yang et al., 1998).
2.3.2 Return Time Map Attack
As will be described in Section 2.4 the RM attack can easily be defeated by performing
the encryption modulation in a time-scaling factor. One might consider than how this
time scaling factor will affect the peaks and time distance of peaks of the transmitted
signal. This method of examining the peak changes in time is the Return Time
Map (RTM) attack (Candaten and Rinaldi, 2000). An example RTM can be seen
in Figure 2.4. Obviously a time-scaling factor that has only a switching event that
occurs at bit changes would be detectable just by observation of the transmitted state
16
for significant changes. The RTM is not necessary in this instance, but as Figure 2.4
shows a RTM can be useful in the instance that simple false switching events occur.
The RTM in Figure 2.4 is applied to a time scaled CSK system with a false switching
event around the origin of the second state x2(t). To perform the RTM attack, a map
is constructed by monitoring only the local maximums, Xi, and the time between
them, dti = ti+1 − ti. Where Xi is the ith local maximum and ti is the time that the
ith local maximum occurs.
2.4 Time Scaling Factor
To overcome the security weakness of the CSK system to the RM attack, the
encryption of the plain-text message m(t) can be handled instead by a ”time scaling
function” λ(x(t),m). If one is to consider any autonomous dynamical system:
d
dt
x = f(x) (2.28)





0 < λ(x) <∞ (2.30)
It’s clear that then:
d
dτ
x = λ(x)f(x) (2.31)
Condition (2.30) implies that the new time τ is strictly monotone and increasing
with respect to time t (Sampei and Furuta, 1986). The result of (2.31) clearly also
shows that the function λ(x) does not change the phase space of x in respect to
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its attractors or equilibriums. This time scaling factor then does not distort the
trajectory of x other than changing the time at which it takes to complete or reach a
certain value (Materassi and Basso, 2008). Clearly if the message m(t) is encoded then
within a time-scaling factor, the RM attack can be defeated through its dependency
on a change in state phase space.
2.4.1 Time Scaling Chaotic Shift Keying
To apply this time-scaling factor to a Lorenz based chaotic system, creating a Time
Scaling Chaotic Shift Keying (TS-CSK) encryption system, a function λ(x,m) is
selected. The resulting system can then be described as:
ẋ1 = σ(x2 − x1)λ(x,m)
ẋ2 =
(
(β − x3)x1 − x2
)
λ(x,m)
ẋ3 = (x1x2 − ρx3)λ(x,m)
ż1 = σ(z2 − z1)λ(z, 0)
ż2 =
(
(β − z3)x1 − z2
)
λ(z, 0)






λm δ(x) = 0
λ1−m δ(x) = 1
(2.33)
Where δ(x) is considered the decision engine. From a security standpoint, the decision
engine should be chosen such that the switching event of λ(x,m) cannot be deciphered
from the transmitted signal. Several possibilities for δ(x) exist. Materassi and Basso
























However this decision engine becomes increasingly difficult and expensive to imple-
ment the faster the Lorenz system oscillates. A initial decision engine was conceived





0 vTx < 0
1 vTx ≥ 0
(2.35)
The decision engine described by (2.34) was found by Materassi and Basso (2008) to
be secure from both the RM attack and the RTM attack. The RM is defeated because
the TS-CSK encryption method does not modify the underlying Lorenz function in
respect to its orbital foci. Further, the TS-CSK method described by (2.32) is secure
against a RM attack for any selection of δ(x) that leaves the underlying Lorenz system
chaotic.
Immunity to the RTM however requires that the time difference between orbits not
be significantly determined by the message m(t). The even-odd scheme devised by
Materassi and Basso (2008) has adequate switching events between bit changes that
the RTM becomes obfuscated such that RTM based bit extraction is not possible.
This property does not hold true for a decision engine employed by the plus-minus
TS-CSK (PM TS-CSK) system (2.35) with a reasonable time difference between bits.











ρ(β − 1)≤ x2(t) < 0












1 x3(t) ≥ β − 1
0 x3(t) < β − 1
(2.37)
This new decision engine sets the regions of operation and switching about the
equilibrium of the system. A switch occurs when the third dynamic x3(t) crosses
from one side of its equilibrium to another. To add more regions of operation, the
system splits the second dynamic into 4 regions; the region below the negative focus,
the region between the negative focus and the origin, the region from the origin to
the positive focus, and finally region above the positive focus. (2.36) and (2.37) form
the 8-section TS-CSK system.
The synchronization of the system (2.32) can again be expressed using the same
Lyapunov function from (2.25) with the same error function Φsync as described in
(2.23). The time derivative of Φsync while the message m(t) = 0 now becomes:
Φ̇1 = σ
(






















The case of interest is when the time scaling factor of both systems is equal, λ(x) =

























(b) Inverting Integrator Operational Amplifier
Figure 2.5: Basic Operational Amplifier Circuits
same operation region. In the case that λ(x) = λ(z), (2.38) will become similar to





. Of course, the two systems will not always be operating in a
region such that λ(x) = λ(z), however due to the cyclic nature of the chaotic system,
as well the property of the time-scaling factor to not change the phase space, the
regions of λ(x) 6= λ(z) are periodic while there is no synchronization. It should also
be noted that the time at which the transmitter system trajectory transverses the
region that causes λ(x) 6= λ(z) will inherently be different from that of the receiver
system. The lack of synchronization when m(t) = 1 is obvious, as for λ(x) = λ(z)
to hold true, x and z will be operating in adjacent regions. Once x and z enter the
same region λ(x) 6= λ(z) and synchronization will not occur.
2.5 Operational Amplifier Circuits
The operational amplifier can be described by an ideal model where the voltage at
both inputs (non-inverting + and inverting −) is forced to be equal by the output
when in closed-loop configuration, additionally no current flows in or out of the inputs
(Horowitz and Hill, 1983). The operating principle of the circuits described in chapter
3 are assumed to be near ideal.
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2.5.1 The Non-Inverting Gain
Figure 2.5a describes the topology of a non-inverting amplifier (DeCarlo and Lin,






















Figure 2.5b describes a summing inverting operation amplifier (Texas Instruments,
2004).

























For practical implementation of the Lorenz system as an encryption device, simula-
tions parameter, tuning and performance testing are completed. This chapter will
detail the steps and manners in which all methodology was completed. Performance
metrics shall be detailed as to ascertain the security and practicality of the encryption
system. Hardware configuration and selection shall be detailed. The base Lorenz
system described in this section uses the form:
ẋ = kσ(y − x)
ẏ = k((β − z)x− y)
ż = k(xy − ρz)
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Numerical simulations were calculated using MATLAB and Simulink. The solver
ode45 was used in Simulink with a relative tolerance of 10−12.
3.1.1 CSK Simulation
The CSK system was modeled in Simulink, and is described by the block diagrams in
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Figure 3.1 represents the encryption transmitter design.
The block labeled βm was implemented using a simple set of math functions such that:




















Figure 3.1: Block diagram of the transmitter for the CSK system









The receiver system in Figure 3.2 is implemented with the modulating constant set
to β0. To allow testing of system robustness to noise a band-limited Gaussian noise η










A synchronization test output is then computed in simulation to yield:





















Figure 3.2: Block diagram of the receiver for the CSK system
The result of (3.3) is then further refined outside of the Simulink simulation using a
MATLAB script described in Section 3.1.3.
3.1.2 TS-CSK simulation
The TS-CSK Simulink block diagram describing the transmitter and receiver are seen

















The function λ(x,m) in both the transmitter and receiver is described in equa-
tion (2.33). In the instance of the receiver λ(z2, 0) is used. A band-limited Gaussian
noise η is added to the transmitted state x1 before entering the receiver to test the
























Figure 3.3: Block diagram of the transmitter for the TS-CSK system
As with the CSK system a synchronization test as described in (3.3) is saved for later
refinement and message extraction.
Message Structure
The message is structured in a manner to decrease the number of incorrectly extracted
bits. Between each bit a padding section is added as a percentage (∇) of overall





m(t) if t ≤ Tt
0 if t > Tt
Where m(t) is the full bit width message with period T and:





























Figure 3.4: Block diagram of the receiver for the TS-CSK system
3.1.3 Message Extraction
The message extraction technique uses a periodic averaging approach with a threshold
decision. Once a decision is made for each potential bit this information is then tested
against m(t) as used in the simulation. This approach requires a previous knowledge
of the expected message frequency. A threshold level must be selected such that
all bits are able to be extracted accurately, in the experimental testing this value is
selected through a range to yield the best results.











1 ψ(t) ≥ χ
0 ψ(t) < χ
(3.5)
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Where ϕ(n) is a weighting function, χ is the threshold, and:




τ1 = τ0 + T





0.5 n < τ0 + (1− w)∆τ
1 n > τ0 + w∆τ
2 otherwise
(3.6)
3.1.4 Bit Error Detection and Testing
To test the system accuracy the message extracted is tested against the original
signal m(t). The padding added to form m̄(t) is ignored for simplicity. The error in












0 if m̄(nT + T
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1 if m̄(nT + T
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tf = final simulation time
Message Types
To test practicality of the TS-CSK and CSK systems two methods of signals are
generated. For short term testing a simple alternating bit pattern is established. This


























Figure 3.5: CSK system Circuit Diagram
effective for tuning maximum message frequency and internal signal parameters. For
long time BER calculations an American Standard Code for Information Interchange
(ASCII) text file is transcribed into a rolling bit stream. The extracted message is
then also able to be saved into a text file, functioning much like an encrypted text
messaging system.
3.2 Circuit Design
To implement the chaotic encryption in circuitry, operational amplifiers and
specialized semi-conductor integrated circuits are used. The components chosen are
Table 3.1: Component Values of the CSK Transmitter and Receiver Circuit
Index Value Index Value
R1, R2 100 kΩ C 0.1 µF
R3, R4 1 MΩ U1, U2, U3 LT1057















Figure 3.6: Circuit Diagram of β Modulator
configured to produce the same dynamical models as shown in equations (2.21) and
(2.32). A scaling factor is utilized to keep system operation within the operating
ranges of the selected hardware. The scale for this work is 100 mV = 1. To assist
in troubleshooting, circuit construction methodology and to verify the commonality
between the numerical simulation and circuit simulation, the CSK system was
designed. The circuit draws heavy inspiration from web published work (Horowitz,
2016). The CSK transmitter and receiver designs can be seen in Figure 3.5.
The CSK system components are selected such that the gains are equivalent to the
parameters listed in (3.1) with the scaling factor taken into account. The component
values of Figure 3.5 are listed in Table 3.1. The β modulation block (Fig. 3.6) is used
for encoding the message within the encryption system. This circuit is a variable gain
circuit constructed from an inverting summing amplifier and two separate inverting
amplifiers, of which one is controlled by the switch U4. The component values for the
β-modulator can be seen in Table 3.2.
The capacitor C is chosen to limit the gain k and the speed of the Lorenz
oscillation to improve resolution with lower cost data acquisition equipment. The
Table 3.2: Component Values of the β-Modulator Circuit
Index Value Index Value
R1, R3 10 kΩ U1, U2 LT1057































Figure 3.7: TS-CSK circuit diagram
LT1057 operational amplifier from Linear Technologies provides a good low noise fast
amplification option as well as having a designated LTspice model. To handle the
multiplication task the AD633 from Analog Devices Inc. was chosen. The AD633 was
selected for its SPICE model availability and overall unit cost. To handle switching
tasks needed within the β-modulator the Maxim Integrated DG419 single pole double
throw (SPDT) analog switch was chosen. All integrated circuit choices can function
off of a ±12 V DC power supply. In full circuit simulation however the DG419 model
Table 3.3: Component Values of the TS-CSK Transmitter and Receiver Circuit
Index Value Index Value
R1, R2 100 kΩ R6 499 kΩ
R3 1 MΩ C 0.1 µF
R4 39 kΩ U1, U2, U3 LT1057
















Figure 3.8: Circuit Diagram of the λ Modulator
is replaced with ideal switching options. The model for the DG419 functions perfectly
in a small scale test of the β-modulator, but creates numerical singularities when used
within the full Lorenz model.
The TS-CSK system as implemented in circuitry is shown in Figure 3.7. As can be
seen, compared to the CSK system the TS-CSK system has added complexity and
circuitry. To maintain the gains from (3.1) the components for the transmitter and
receiver in Figure 3.7 are selected as shown in Table 3.3. Also to maintain similarity
to the CSK system, and to reduce the neccasity for additional gates, the λ-modulation
function is distributed inside of the equations. Such that (2.32) becomes:
q̇1 = σ(λ(q,m)q2 − λ(q,m)q1)
q̇2 = βg − gq3 − λ(q,m)q2
q̇3 = gq2 − ρλ(q,m)q3
(3.7)
Where g is selected as either λ(q,m)q1 or λ(q,m)s depending on whether the system
is a transmitter or receiver respectively.
The λ-modulator is a combination of two circuits, the decision engine circuit for the
Table 3.4: Component Values of the λ-Modulator Circuit
Index Value Index Value
R1, R2 100 kΩ R6 76.9 kΩ
R3, R5 100 kΩ U1, U2 LT1057
R4 15 kΩ U3 DG419
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8-section TS-CSK system is described in Appendix A and a binary gain shown in
Figure 3.8. The PM TS-CSK decision engine circuit is also described in Appendix A.
The λ-modulator variable gain block is constructed of two non-inverting operational
amplifier gain paths, of which selection is set by the DG419 SPDT switch. As is
inherent with the non-inverting amplifier, the gain of each amp must be G > 1. To
meet the specifications of (3.1) a simple resistor voltage divider is used at the entrance
to one of the amplifier stages. Driving the DG419 requires a pull-up resistor on the
output of the logic gate circuit, this was implemented off board in the initial board
configuration, the later secondary decision engine board incorporated this design
feature on board. The decision engine uses a series of comparators, voltage references
and logic gates to perform the λ selection. The 8-section TS-CSK decision engine
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√
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Figure 3.9: Circuit Diagram of Φ1 = x1 − z1
The LT1011 from Linear Technology was selected as the comparator for its LTspice
model availability and performance. A 74HC00D series NAND chip was selected to
provide the four NAND gates used within logic, and the 74HC266D series was chosen
to perform the two XNOR operations. To create the reference points ±
√
ρ(β − 1)
and β−1, two LT1004-2.5 Zener diodes are used to provide steady ±2.5 V references.
The desired reference points are then set via a resistor division network.
All components in the TS-CSK circuit are chosen with the best available tolerance
selection to minimize gain mismatches between the transmitter and receiver circuits.
All resistors are chosen to have a tolerance of 0.1%. The capacitors used in the
integrator blocks are selected with a tolerance of 1.0%, with the capacitor used for
comparator operation selected with a tolerance of 5.0%.
3.3 Circuit Simulation
To simulate both the CSK and TS-CSK circuits Linear Technology’s LTspice IV
version 4.23l was used. This simulation tool, provided free of charge by Linear
Technology, contains a graphical circuit net editing tool integrated with a SPICE
simulator, diagnostic tools, and graphical data rendering. The solver is configured
with default settings except the alternate solver option is selected.
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3.3.1 Model Parameters
Each component was modeled using readily available SPICE models. The AD633
was implemented using a model provided by Analog Innovations (Thompson, 2016).
The DG419 was modeled in initial λ-block testing with the MAX319 model from
Maxim-Integrated (2017). The LT1057, LT1011A, resistor, capacitor, diode and
source models are selected from the standard library.
3.3.2 Simulations
Initial simulations were used to tune the component parameters to obtain the desired
operation in conjunction with following the parameter guidelines of Section 2.1. This
was done by comparing Φ1 = x1 − z1 with the message signal. The message used
was an alternating bit pattern to simulate the worst case switching scenario. The
message was also tuned in frequency to provide a reasonable data transfer rate and to
reduce errors present in Φ1 as well as take into account limitations in available data
acquisition equipment.
Once circuit values were configured, longer runs were completed and the output data
saved. The output data for both the CSK and TS-CSK were imported into the
MATLAB environment and the RTMs calculated. Due to the duration of simulation
times and machine memory limitations, BERs were not calculated for the simulated
circuitry.
To ensure real world reliability and function, a Monte-Carlo simulation was ran for
the TS-CSK system. Each component was specified to its nominal value with the
part tolerance included. The input message signal was configured as one period high
and two periods low to monitor system synchronization.
36
(a) Top Layer of circuit board (b) Bottom Layer of circuit board
Figure 3.10: Gerber view of the TS-CSK system PCB
3.4 Practical Implementation
The practical implementation and construction of the system is described in
this section. The physical construction is designed with electronic breadboard
compatibility in mind. Due to the need for high precision components and the shear
volume of components, surface mount devices (SMD) were used. To implement SMD
components with electronic breadboard, custom printed circuit boards (PCB) were
designed.
To verify that the chosen hardware configuration functioned as expected, a single
Lorenz system circuit was constructed using through-hole components. The resulting
circuit was cumbersome in breadboard real estate usage, however was useful in proving
the proper operation of the base Lorenz system in circuitry. The λ-block was then
also configured using a breadboard circuit to verify continued function of the Lorenz
system. After confirmation of component choice and function, a multiple purpose
PCB was designed. The PCB trace, hole and component layout can be seen in









for use with the less secure method of two region
switching. The resistors R14 and R15 as seen in Figure 3.10a at the bottom center
of the board, are used in coordination as a solderable jumper selection for either
transmitter or receiver operation. This can be seen in Figure 3.11a as R14 is solder
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(a) Top Layer of circuit board (b) Bottom Layer of circuit board
Figure 3.11: Photograph of the constructed TS-CSK system PCB
bridged, indicating a transmitter configuration. It should be noted that a 0603 size
C5 can be seen in both Figure 3.10a and Figure 3.11a, this place is left to allow for
the addition of a capacitor to form a high pass filter before the on board comparator.
Initial testing and troubleshooting revealed the necessity of a pull-up resistor on
the output of the last logic gate before the system of switches, this resistor was not
included on the initial board. This oversight was due to the use of a different logic
gate in breadboard testing. Once single board operation was verified, a second board
was added to the breadboard. The transmitter and receiver were then coupled. A
message m(t) is created by a digital output of an Arduino NANO. The frequency
and bit padding of the message m(t) is set through a custom Universal Asynchronous
Receiver/Transmitter (UART) protocol.
This initial board, the dynamics board, as seen in Figure 3.11 incorporates a simple
decision engine that performs the decision from (2.33). This decision engine is located
in the upper right hand corner of Figure 3.11a, and is comprised of U1 and IC11. The
decision engine of (2.33) leaves the encryption system highly vulnerable to a RTM
and as such a more complicated decision engine was designed. The Gerber board
layout can be seen in Figure 3.12. The board construction is designed such that
the 5-pin connector directly interfaces with the right most connector of Figure 3.11a.
To save on board cost, the signal input connection of the decision engine board was
38
(a) Top Layer of circuit board (b) Bottom Layer of circuit board
Figure 3.12: Gerber Layout of Decision Engine PCB
not extended to reach the second state 5-pin connector of the dynamics board. The
connection to incorporate q2(t) and q3(t) is implemented on the breadboard. To allow
the decision engine and dynamics board to interface together IC11 is removed from
the dynamics board. The decision engine was designed to incorporate the pull-up
resistor for the gate output. The constructed decision engine board can be seen in
Figure 3.13.
To extract sync(t) = x1(t) − z1(t), a LT1057 was set up in differential amplifier
configuration. This can be seen in Figure 3.9. An anti-parallel diode couple are
placed in series with the amplifier output to remove the small synchronization signal
error present from resistor and gain mismatches between the transmitter and receiver.
3.5 Data Acquisition Methods
To provide both the 5 V and differential ±12 V an 480W ATX computer power supply
was used, the Logisys PS480D-BK. The higher power wattage was selected such that
the −12 V supply can provide up to 800 mA. The selection was also in part due to
fast availability and lower price.
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(a) Top Layer of circuit
board
(b) Bottom Layer of
circuit board
Figure 3.13: Photograph of the constructed Decision Engine PCB
The message delivery was accomplished using a Arduino NANO clone obtained from
MPJA. The NANO would receive characters from a MATLAB script through the
serial UART port. Through the UART port the frequency, bit padding, character
and start send command could be received. The NANO can send one character (8
bits) at a time. A second pin from the NANO is used as a falling-edge trigger to
synchronize the data acquisition (DAQ) device with the character being sent.
Data acquisition is accomplished using a National Instruments USB-6008 DAQ device.
The device is capable of being triggered externally, has eight 12-bit single ended or
differential analog inputs, and has a single channel max sample rate of 10,000 samples
per second. The DC ground of the circuits, power supply, DAQ and NANO are
connected in common. Data is then gathered as a single ended input. One channel
collecting Φ1(t) from the output of the diode threshold device from Figure 3.9. The
second channel is used to gather the message being sent from the NANO device.
Data was gathered at 5kS/s per channel. It should be noted that the USB-6008 does
not simultaneously gather data from channels, and rather staggers point acquisitions,




Results are acquired using the parameters listed in (3.1). The CSK and TS-CSK
system use the modulating gains as described by (3.2). All graph figures were created
using MATLAB and exported as Encapsulated Postscript Vector graphics (.eps) files.
See appendix D for enlarged figures.
For comparison of basic pattern detection Figure 4.1 shows the response of the
transmitted signal x1(t) in relation to the encrypted message m(t). Figure 4.1a
shows that response as simulated in the Simulink model described in Section 3.1.
Figure 4.1b shows the real world data gathered including the actual m(t) signal.
Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show all results for the return map (RM) attack described
in Section 2.3.1. Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b are a comparison of RMs calculated
m(t)
t (seconds)








































































































(b) TS-CSK System Simulink












































(a) CSK System SPICE
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(b) TS-CSK System SPICE







































Figure 4.4: Return Map of TS-CSK system in circuitry
in numerical simulations for both the CSK and TS-CSK system, respectively. An
exploded detail to show the difference in bit paths for the CSK system is seen in
Figure 4.2a. Figure 4.3a and Figure 4.3b show the RMs derived from LTSPICE
simulations. Figure 4.4 shows the RM gathered from the actual circuit. The TS-CSK
system used to compare to the CSK system is the 8-section TS-CSK system, although
the PM TS-CSK system demonstrates a similar RM. These RMs were measured using
an alternating bit pattern at a frequency of 1 Hz for the circuit simulation and actual
data, no bit padding is added to any bit.
Figure 4.8 shows the bit error rate (BER) of the TS-CSK with added noise. The graph
is scaled to show BER versus the signal to noise ratio of transmitted signal x1(t)
in decibels (dB). The data was gathered using an arbitrary cutoff χ as described
in Section 3.1.3. The weighting function φ(n) is selected with a weighting band
w = 0.8 as described by (3.6). Figure 4.10 shows the LTSPICE simulation of the
worst possible case parameter mismatch caused by component tolerance issues. This
selection was chosen from a Monte-Carlo simulation consisting of 300 runs, where










































(a) PM TS-CSK Simulink
m=1
m=0





































(b) 8-section TS-CSK Simulink













































(a) PM TS-CSK SPICE








































(b) 8-section TS-CSK SPICE
















































































(b) 8-section TS-CSK Actual Circuit
Figure 4.7: Return Time Maps from circuit implementations
47












Figure 4.8: Noise and Parameter Mismatch Characteristics





and the bottom figure shows m(t).
Figure 4.9 shows the fast Fourier transform (FFT) of the transmitted signal x1(t) with
a 0.5 Hz alternating bit signal. Figure 4.9a shows the simulation FFT in LTSPICE,
while Figure 4.9b shows the FFT of the actual circuit. The SPICE simulation data set
required interpolation to obtain a fixed time sample to perform the FFT. Figure 4.9c
shows a wider power spectral density (PSD) view of the actual circuit.
Table 4.1 shows the results of a randomly selected plain-text message encryption test.
A file of initially 2500 characters was randomly generated from ASCII characters in
the range of HEX value 0x20 to 0x7E. The bound on these characters was due to
communication issues via UART between MATLAB and the message signal generator
for characters greater than 0x7E. The Simulation test required a larger file. 10000
additional randomly generated characters are appended onto the first 2500 for the
Simulink simulation. The 8-section TS-CSK was limited to 1620 characters in the



















































(c) Wider PSD Circuit Implementation















Figure 4.10: Noise and Parameter Mismatch Characteristics
while the PM TS-CSK and 8-section TS-CSK practical circuits obtained BERs of
800ppm and 3000ppm respectively. The practical tests did not sequentially encrypted
characters due to limitations of the data acquisition equipment, the simulation
did sequentially encrypted all 12500 characters. The practical experiment took
approximately 6.5 hours and 12 hours to complete for the PM TS-CSK and 8-section
TS-CSK respectively. The 8-section TS-CSK used a message frequency of 0.5 Hz
while the PM TS-CSK used a message frequency of 1Hz. The 8-section TS-CSK
circuit required a slower message frequency due to poor synchronization.
Table 4.1: Bit Error Rate (BER) Test Results
Simulation Practical (P&M) Practical (8 State)
High Misses 0 0 38
High Bits 47964 9658 6234
Low Misses 0 16 0
Low Bits 52036 10342 6726
Total Misses 0 16 38
Total Bits 100000 20000 12960




This thesis has detailed the process of creating the encryption system itself, and
as such should be seen as a starting point for product potential. In this chapter
the performance of the TS-CSK system as a whole will be evaluated, the potential
performance improvements described, and the practical considerations for this system
for use in real-life secure transmission systems.
5.1 System Performance
The performance of the 8 state TS-CSK system, with comparison to the CSK and
PM TS-CSK system, shows the potential for this cryptographic method in practical
implementation. The overall performance of the TS-CSK system can be broken into
several sections. The most important performance characteristic to practicality is
the synchronization performance, followed by the noise performance, the mismatch
performance, and lastly the security performance. While security is paramount for
any encryption system, functioning synchronization, noise and mismatch performance
dictate the usability. If the security is weak, and the other performance good, the
system can be used as a weak encryption method. In the instance the security is





Figure 5.1: The Synchronization Error Φ vs the scaled message m(t) of the 8 section
TS-CSK circuit
5.1.1 Synchronization Performance
The synchronization performance of the TS-CSK system is evaluated in an overall
manner by Table 4.1. The first column depicts the 8-state TS-CSK system simulated
in MATLAB and Simulink. As can be seen after having processed 12500 characters,
not a single bit error was made from the simple weighted averaging over bit
periods described in Section 3.1.3. This performance shows a bit error rate (BER)
performance of better than 10 parts per million (ppm).
The second column of Table 4.1 shows the BER gathered from a test of the simple
PM TS-CSK system. As is shown the performance is decreased by at least an order
of magnitude at 800 ppm BER. The last column shows the 8-state TS-CSK system
with a performance of 3000 ppm BER, or otherwise stated as a 0.3% BER.
The performance of the PM TS-CSK system is acceptable, and if implemented with
parity checking would not degrade communication quality or speed significantly. The
8-state TS-CSK system however has near quadruple the amount of errors of the PM
TS-CSK system. Interestingly in both cases the optimum cutoff value lead to a
strictly low miss for the PM TS-CSK system and a strictly high miss for the 8-section
TS-CSK system.
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In the instance of the PM TS-CSK it could be seen that at certain bit changes to 1
the magnitude of the synchronization error Φ was much smaller than that of other
bit changes to 1. This lead to the asymmetric bit type miss rates for optimum BER.
Figure 5.1 shows that in some cases the 8-state TS-CSK system suffered almost no
magnitude change between 0 and 1 bits. This caused the 8-state TS-CSK system
to also have bit changes to 1 that could not be extracted from the synchronized
background. Notably Figure 5.1 also shows that during the non-synchronizing bit Φ
has an increased frequency.
5.1.2 Noise Performance
The BER caused by noise of the TS-CSK system has a rather sharp cutoff for the
simple weighted averaging method. Figure 4.8 shows the response of the TS-CSK
system to input noise. As can be seen at a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of less than
approximately 40dB leads to the a sudden rise from a near perfect BER to a complete
loss of all 0 bits. Cisco Meraki recommends a SNR of 25dB for voice applications and
20dB for data networks in wireless communications. An improvement of performance
to the TS-CSK system to decrease the minimum SNR would be necessary for use in
standard wireless communication systems.
5.1.3 Mismatch Performance
Monte-Carlo simulations of the 8-section TS-CSK system in SPICE with resistor and
capacitor tolerances. taken into account indicated that synchronization, with the
selection of high accuracy components, should have been excellent. This was not
what was observed in real circuitry, synchronization mismatch became quite severe
within the 8-section TS-CSK system, as is seen in Figure 5.1. Figure 4.10 then shows
the results later gathered with the maximum offsets applied to the reference voltages
in a worst case scenario along with passive component tolerances. This result comes
more in line with what was observed within actual circuitry.
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The new Monte-Carlo simulations indicate that this synchronization error is not
derived from the passive component mismatch, but rather from the mismatch of
zener diode regulation voltage. Both the transmitter and receiver have a separate
decision engine board, so while the origin crossing point will be the same for both the
upper and lower foci and third state foci set point will inherently be different as the
zener diodes chosen are limited to ±1% accuracy.
An additional source of synchronization mismatch of the live circuit could be
attributed to the solderless breadboard performance. Two breadboards were used
with the circuit. One was used to gather all results within this work. The second
slightly larger breadboard failed to allow the circuit pair to function. The issue was
noted, but further experimentation was not completed to discern the cause of failure
of one breadboard over the other. The breadboard that failed has been used in other
circuitry prototyping.Supply voltages were verified with a digital multimeter across
both breadboards.
5.1.4 Security Performance
To evaluate the security of the TS-CSK encryption scheme and the vulnerabilities
of a chaotic encryption scheme several comparisons and tests were performed. To
ensure good system security the TS-CSK system’s return and return time maps are
compared for security, and the standard methods of cryptanalysis considered.
Return Map Attack Immunity
The return maps (RM) for both a standard CSK and a TS-CSK system were
determined. These RMs are shown in Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 starting on page 42.
The CSK system RM can be seen in Figure 4.2a as calculated from the MATLAB
and Simulink model, another RM generated from the LTSPICE model can be seen in
Figure 4.3a. Likewise Figures 4.2b and 4.3b show the RM for the TS-CSK system as
calculated from the MATLAB and LTSPICE models respectively. Additionally the
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RM of the constructed TS-CSK circuit can be seen in Figure 4.4.
The CSK RMs clearly show a distinction from the maximums that exist at m(t) = 0
and m(t) = 1 once a single region is selected and the scale expanded. This is due
the small difference between β0 and β1. The distinction becomes more ambiguous
towards the ends of each streak, however the majority of minimums and maximums
measured show clear distinction. The effect of noise on the RM of a CSK system
was not analyzed. Materassi and Basso argue that while noise would distort a RM
it would also adversely effect system performance, and as such cannot be relied upon
to defeat the RM.
The TS-CSK system with encryption of the message m(t) encoded within a time
scaling factor is easily shown to be immune to the RM as was expected by
Section 2.3.1. The RM shown in Figure 4.4 was obtained using a noisy power supply
and a simple DAQ device, the RM shows a very similar structure to that calculated
from both simulation types. It was noticed that the extraction of the local minimums
and maximums was more complicated than that of the simulated systems, as line noise
and DAQ resolution had to be taken into account. The almost linear distribution of
points from Figure 4.4 is due to poor DAQ resolution.
Return Time Map Attack Immunity
The return time map (RTM) attack simulations can be seen in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7
starting on page 45. The figures show the simple PM TS-CSK system in comparison
to the 8 section TS-CSK system. Figures 4.5a and 4.5b show the RTMs from the
MATLAB simulation of the PM TS-CSK and 8 section TS-CSK systems respectively.
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b show the RTMs from the SPICE simulation of the PM TS-CSK
and 8 section TS-CSK systems respectively. Lastly Figures 4.7a and 4.7b show the
RTMs calculated from live gathered data for the PM TS-CSK and 8 section TS-CSK
systems respectively.
It is clear to see from the RTMs that the PM TS-CSK method is wholly vulnerable
to the RTM attack. Even in data gathered from the real world circuit with low-end
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DAQ equipment, the distinction between m = 1 and m = 0 states is significant. The
effectiveness of this method with low cost equipment indicates that unlike parameter
estimation from live measurement, this RTM attack does not require precise or
expensive equipment to perform and be successful.
The 8 section TS-CSK method does show some splitting between modes in the positive
orbit to negative orbit changed, shown by the upper left set formed. This was observed
strongly in the SPICE simulation, however not as strongly in the MATLAB simulation
and with even greater ambiguity in the real world acquisition. This is also seen for
the negative orbit to positive orbit change to a lesser degree from the upper right set.
The orbits about the positive and negative foci are shown to be completely immune.
Ciphertext attacks
Menezes et al. lists a series of attacks that are typically applied to digital encryption
methods and ciphers. While not all of the methods listed by Menezes et al. apply to
the chaotic analog encryption scheme of the TS-CSK system, some do warrant short
investigation.
Ciphertext-Only Attack
The RM and RTM are ciphertext-only attacks. Vulnerability to this attack leaves the
encryption method entirely insecure (Menezes et al., 1996). The PM TS-CSK and
CSK systems are then easily proven to be completely insecure by the RTM and RM
attacks respectively. Outside of the RM or RTM approach, the only other method of
attack that can be made from ciphertext-only would be an attempt to estimate the
foci points from the transmitted state. This method has been shown to break the
security of the CSK system as well (Orue et al., 2006).
The estimation of the foci however only provides a ratio function to the adversary
(Orue et al., 2006). As the only foci that can be estimated from the two possible
transmission states of the Lorenz system are the x1(t) and x2(t) states. Therefore the
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This relation is very useful if either the ρ or β parameter is changing, however the
TS-CSK system doesn’t exhibit this. This relation only serves to reduce the potential
key-space possibilities, which for a TS-CSK system is countered by the ability to have
the λ(x,m) term be a portion of the key space.
Known-Plaintext and Chosen-Plaintext Attacks
The form of attack derived from inserting a known plain-text message and then
drawing comparisons to the responding ”ciphertext” is not applicable to any CSK
system implemented in circuitry. The message will only effect the orbitals or orbital
speed regime for CSK and TS-CSK system receptively. A repetition of ciphertext
will only apply when the initial conditions of the system can be guaranteed, which
is not possible within a circuit without internal knowledge of the Lorenz system and
significantly accurate measurements of the state values.
Sweeping Parameters
The brute force method of breaking the CSK or TS-CSK encryption involves an
adversary designing a receiver with the same topology and with a sample of ciphertext
sweeping parameters until synchronization is achieved for one instance. As with the
RM and RTM attack, once a synchronizing configuration is found the adversary can
retrieve the underlying bit change structure and decrypt two separate possibilities.
This method is only practical to apply in the instance that the key space is small
enough and an accurately reproducible sample is available.
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Key Space
Other than defeating a RM attack, the TS-CSK also provides a much greater key
space. If the switching events are obfuscated sufficiently to remove vulnerability
to the RTM attack, the parameters λ0 and λ1 can be used to greatly increase the
keyspace of the provided underlying Lorenz system.
The size of the keyspace can be described as:
kL = The available keyspace of the Lorenz system
kS = The available keyspace of the Time Scaling system
kT = The number of decision engines immune to TS and TS-CSK
kFULL = kLkSkT
kL will have a corresponding range for each key about which it will still synchronize
well enough to perform bit extraction. As such kL will be finite due to the
synchronization band limit and the limitation of parameter combinations capable
of providing a chaotic system that will operate within a region of circuitry that is
sufficient. The parameter ranges and bounding are described in Section 2.1.
kS has limitation imposed by general circuitry speed response concerns, as well as
power spectral density (PSD) spread concerns. kT is limited by the methods that
lead to RTM immunity and that provide a practical method for implementation.
5.2 Practical Considerations
The TS-CSK system created for this work has shown considerable promise for
use within a commercial communication system. However, the current method
of bit extraction, minimum SNR, and other synchronization error issues prevent




Improvements to synchronization within the real circuit would significantly increase
the practical usage capability of the TS-CSK as a real-world encryption device.
Improvement opportunities exist in the circuitry, bit extraction method, and switching
decision methods.
Circuitry Improvements
There are several improvements to the electrical circuit of the TS-CSK system that
could be made in future work. The largest issue seen in synchronization mismatch
seemed to be derived from unequal reference voltages in the decision engines. A
higher accuracy voltage source along with a tuned reference would likely provide
greater precision between mirrored switching reference points. Likewise, a controlled
tuning reference could also take into account voltage differences that may occur in
real applications due to local ambient differences.
Circuit noise improvements would also be available. While the majority of the
circuitry and components are retained onto either the dynamics PCB or the decision
engine PCB, which both have ground planes, inter-board connections still use the
breadboard interface. A purpose-built PCB could be developed to contain sockets
for the dynamics and decision PCBs as well as power and measurement connections.
The power supply itself, a personal ATX power supply claims to be low noise and
ripple, however no datasheet is available for the power supply used. The use of a
higher quality power supply could also reduce noise.
Bit Extraction
The simple weighted periodic averaging method used for bit extraction in this work is
highly susceptible to noise and mismatch in synchronization. Bit extraction becomes
increasingly difficult as the difference between synchronous and non-synchronous bits
shrinks. A peak detection method may work more adequately, where the peaks of Φ
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above some threshold within an integration section are averaged and a running tally
is used to provide an additional weighting factor. This method might be adequate to
extract bits from synchronization signals like that of Figure 5.1.
Other methods of bit extraction could be created around some other pattern
recognition algorithm. However, for one of the intended uses of this work. Extraction
algorithms that require heavy software processing are not desired. The error present
from synchronization mismatch rather than a non-synchronous bit should also be
explored in future work. A difference in power spectral density between error causes
could potentially lead to a filtering option to improve simple bit extraction methods.
Switching Decision Methods
The switching decision chosen to limit the need for high speed ADC devices is shown
in this work to function, but at a far worse BER than the more simple yet insecure two
state PM TS-CKS switching decision. Improvements to this method could possibly
be obtained by performing a linear adjustment function set to one or more states and
then comparing to the ground reference, i.e. the origin. Two decisions which would





0 x2 ≥ x1





0 x2 ≥ 0
1 x2 < 0
(5.1)
δ(x) = (a0 ⊕ a1)⊕m(t) (5.2)
(5.1) and (5.2) could further be expanded in some manner by also comparing the x2
or x1 with x3 to double the regions generated. Again these regions would also not
rely on an external source.
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5.2.2 Wireless Transmission Usage
Figure 4.9 shows the LTSPICE simulation and live gathered FFT of the TS-CSK
system. As can be seen the system implemented in this work has a narrow
band. Figure 4.8 shows that any CSK method is not fit for use with amplitude
modulation (AM) methods and wireless transmission use will require phase or
frequency modulation (PM/FM) or other noise robust methods. Future work to
implement the TS-CSK system in a standard FM band for personal communications,
especially those used by police and military forces, is the next step in bringing the
TS-CSK system to full utility.
5.3 Closing Remarks
The TS-CSK system promises to secure a near 30 year old method of analog
encryption proposed by Pecora and Carroll. Further more an initial mistake made by
the author of this thesis allowed for live circuit bit extraction using an RTM attack
for the PM TS-CSK system, showing the effectiveness of this method with low-end
equipment and real-world noise concerns. A second method of switching decision was
conceived in haste that defeated the RTM that did not rely on an analog to digital
converter (ADC), the 8-section TS-CSK system.
This work has shown that while the simulation results show good synchronization of
the 8-section TS-CSK system, the actual circuits dependency on voltage references
for the decision engine do not provide adequate results. It should considered from
this result that an ADC switching scheme will rely on a likewise mismatched voltage
source pair. A greater method of robust synchronization in the decision engine will
greatly improve this system’s field use as an encryption system. Further work should
investigate FM broadcast capability in both analog form and a DSP processed digital
form. Additionally by reducing the value of the capacitor that forms the op amp
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integrator to increase the speed gain k should be completed in future work to bring
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Figure A.1 shows the circuit for the decision engine as described by (2.36). The
components used to construct the decision engine are listed in Table A.1. Figure A.2
shows the decision engine circuit for the PM TS-CSK system.
Table A.1: Component Values of the λ-Modulator Circuit
Index Value Manufacturer Part Number
R1, R4, R19 100 kΩ Yageo RT0603BRD07100KL
R2, R5 261 kΩ Panasonic ERA-3AEB2613V
R3, R6 102 kΩ Panasonic ERA-3AEB1023V
R7, R10, R13, R16 20 kΩ Yageo RT0603BRD0720KL
R8, R11, R14, R17 1 MΩ Stackpole RNCF0603BKC1M00
R9, R12, R15, R18 10 kΩ Yageo RT0603BRD0710KL
D 1N4148 Micro Com. 1N4148WX-TP
C 3 nF Murata GRM1885C1H302JA01D
Z - Texas Inst. LT1004IPWR-2-5
U1, U2, U3, U4 - Linear Tech. LT1011CS8#PBF
U5 - ON Semi. MC74HC00ADR2G
































































































B.1 Listing of Components Used in Circuit from
Figure [3.11]
The following pages contain the component listing for all components used within the
main dynamics PCBs.
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Board Index Value Figure Figure Index Manufacturer Part Number Footprint
R1 100 kΩ 3.7 R1 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R2 100 kΩ 3.7 R2 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R3 39 kΩ 3.7 R4 Panasonic ERA-8AEB393V R1206
R4 10 kΩ 3.7 R5 Yageo RT1206BRD0710KL R1206
R5 1 MΩ 3.7 R3 Yageo RT1206BRD071ML R1206
R6 10 kΩ 3.7 R7 Yageo RT1206BRD0710KL R1206
R7 499 kΩ 3.7 R6 Yageo RT1206BRD07499KL R1206
R8 100 kΩ 3.8:X R1 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R9 100 kΩ 3.8:X R2 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R10 100 kΩ 3.8:X R3 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R11 15 kΩ 3.8:X R4 Stackpole RNCF1206BKC15K0 R1206
R12 100 kΩ 3.8:X R5 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R13 76.8 kΩ 3.8:X R6 Panasonic ERA-8AEB7682V R1206
R14 Short - - - - R1206
R15 Short - - - - R1206
R16 20 kΩ A.1 R1 Yageo RT1206BRD0720KL R1206
R17 1 MΩ A.1 R2 Yageo RT1206BRD071ML R1206
R18 100 kΩ A.1 R3 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
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Board Index Value Figure Figure Index Manufacturer Part Number Footprint
R19 100 kΩ 3.8:Y R1 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R20 100 kΩ 3.8:Y R2 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R21 100 kΩ 3.8:Y R3 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R22 15 kΩ 3.8:Y R4 Stackpole RNCF1206BKC15K0 R1206
R23 100 kΩ 3.8:Y R5 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R24 76.8 kΩ 3.8:Y R6 Panasonic ERA-8AEB7682V R1206
R25 100 kΩ 3.8:Z R1 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R26 100 kΩ 3.8:Z R2 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R27 100 kΩ 3.8:Z R3 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R28 15 kΩ 3.8:Z R4 Stackpole RNCF1206BKC15K0 R1206
R29 100 kΩ 3.8:Z R5 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R30 76.8 kΩ 3.8:Z R6 Panasonic ERA-8AEB7682V R1206
R31 10 kΩ A.1 R4 Yageo RT1206BRD0710KL R1206
R32 100 kΩ 3.8:S R1 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R33 100 kΩ 3.8:S R2 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R34 100 kΩ 3.8:S R3 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R35 15 kΩ 3.8:S R4 Stackpole RNCF1206BKC15K0 R1206
R36 100 kΩ 3.8:S R5 Yageo RT1206BRD07100KL R1206
R37 76.8 kΩ 3.8:S R6 Panasonic ERA-8AEB7682V R1206
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Board Index Value Figure Figure Index Manufacturer Part Number Footprint
C1 0.1 µF 3.7 C KEMET C1812C104F5GAC7800 C1812
C2 0.1 µF 3.7 C KEMET C1812C104F5GAC7800 C1812
C3 0.1 µF 3.7 C KEMET C1812C104F5GAC7800 C1812
C4 3 nF A.1 C2 Murata Elec. NA GRM1885C1H302JA01D C0603
C5 short - - - - C0603
D1 - A.1 D1 Micro Com. Co. 1N4148W-TP SOD-123
D2 - A.1 D2 Micro Com. Co. 1N4148W-TP SOD-123
IC1 - 3.7 U1, U2 Linear Tech. LT1057S8#PBF 8-SO
IC2 - 3.8:X U1, U2 Linear Tech. LT1057S8#PBF 8-SO
IC3 - 3.7 U3 Linear Tech. LT1057S8#PBF 8-SO
IC4 - 3.8:Y U1, U2 Linear Tech. LT1057S8#PBF 8-SO
IC5 - 3.8:Y U3 Maxim Int. DG419LEUA+ 8-µMAX
IC6 - 3.8:Z U1, U2 Linear Tech. LT1057S8#PBF 8-SO
IC7 - 3.8:X U3 Maxim Int. DG419LEUA+ 8-µMAX
IC8 - 3.8:Z U3 Maxim Int. DG419LEUA+ 8-µMAX
IC9 - 3.8:S U1, U2 Linear Tech. LT1057S8#PBF 8-SO
IC10 - 3.8:S U3 Maxim Int. DG419LEUA+ 8-µMAX
IC11 - A.1 U2 Texas Inst. SN74HC266DR 14-SO
U$1 - A.1 U1 Linear Tech. LT1011CS8#PBF 8-SO
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Board Index Value Figure Figure Index Manufacturer Part Number Footprint
U$2 - 3.7 U4 Analog Dev. Inc. AD633ARZ-R7 8-SO
U$3 - 3.7 U5 Analog Dev. Inc. AD633ARZ-R7 8-SO
SV1 - - - Amphenol 68021-210HLF 0.1” Pitch
SV2 - - - Amphenol 68021-210HLF 0.1” Pitch




C.1 λ gain calculations
Ideal operational amplifier behavior is assumed, as such voltage and both inputs is
equal, and neither inputs allow current in or out. Calculation variables are in reference

























































































s d = 1












































































Figure C.2: TS-CSK Circuit
C.2 Full Circuit Calculations
Ideal operational amplifier behavior is assumed same as section [C.1]. The behavior






The multipliers are configured such that vc = 0, and U4 is configured such that the
input vb is inverted. The currents of the system with the switch set to select λq1(t)
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are:
ia = i1 + i2
ib = i3 + i4 + i5































































































































The scale for the system is set such that 100 mV = 1 as such 10 V = 100. R3 is used
to set the resistance scale. We select 1 MΩ as the base resistance. The system can be




Specifically choose R̂5 = R̂7 = 100
R5 = R7 = 10 kΩ
Using this change along with the scaling set at 100 mV:
q̇1 = kλ(q,m)R̂1(q2 − q1)
q̇2 = kλ(q,m)
(










Where C is in Farads. The Lorenz parameters (σ,β,ρ) are set by the scaled resistors





Figure D.1: Expanded View of Figure 3.10a
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Figure D.2: Expanded View of Figure 3.11a
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Figure D.3: Expanded View of Figure 3.12a
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Figure D.9: Expanded View of Figure 4.3a
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Figure D.14: Expanded View of Figure 4.6a
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Figure D.17: Expanded View of Figure 4.7b
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Figure D.23: Expanded View of Figure 5.1
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